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1 Introduction
[Van der Sandt, 1992] introduces [Lewis, 1979]’ notion of accommodation in Discourse Rep-
resentation Theory [Kamp and Reyle, 1993] as a tool to account for gaps in the discourse.
His theory of presupposition projection takes presuppositions to behave like anaphora.
Anaphoric expressions normally are linked to antecedents that have previously been estab-
lished in the discourse. If example (1) would appear in a context where no king of France is
present – hence no antecedent is available – then Van der Sandt’s algorithm accommodates
the existence of a king of France.
(1) When I give a party, the king of France always attends it.
This is different from the situation where a definite description can be linked to an an-
tecedent that was previously introduced by an indefinite description, as in (2). There
is no need to accommodate an antecedent, because there is already a suitable candidate
available.
(2) When I invite a celebrity, the celebrity never comes.
Example (3) however is slightly different. There is no actual antecedent for the anaphoric
expression the barkeeper, but because of a bar, there isn’t really a problem, apparently
there is some implicit antecedent. Van der Sandt’s projection algorithm fails to make this
implicit link, and accommodates the existence of a barkeeper to the global context, in fact
no theory on presupposition that we know of can deal with these1.
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(3) When I go to a bar, the barkeeper always throws me out.
Contrasting (3) with (4) makes our point even clearer; this sentence sounds truly infe-
licitous. The hearer tries to somehow link this barkeeper with familiar information, and
fails.
(4) ? When I go to a playground, the barkeeper always throws me out.
A bar provides sufficient information to license the barkeeper, but in a playground there is
nothing that can establish such a link. Making a link between the new discourse referent
(i.e. the barkeeper) to the network of discourse referents that is already established, is
called bridging ([Clark, 1975], [Heim, 1982]). Definite descriptions that can be bridged to
existing information do not need the accommodation of new referents; example (1) requires
accommodation, but (3) can be solved with mere bridging. An adequate theory of presup-
position obviously needs a serious explanation of bridging to account for the projection
problem of presupposition.
To account for these phenomena, we borrow from [Pustejovsky, 1991] and compare bridging
with coercion. Pustejovsky presents examples like (5):
(5) I would like to begin a new book tonight.
Here, too, some information is missing: begin implies some event, but a new book is an
artifact. The fact that the speaker should be interpreted as beginning to read the book, or
– if he is a writer – to write one, is motivated by what we know about book. Pustejovsky
claims that such information should be considered lexical knowledge of the noun, which
is represented in a so-called qualia structure. Based on this information, arguments of
improper types can be coerced to proper ones. We will see how a similar approach can be
followed to account for bridging .
In section 2 we will present Pustejovsky’s ideas in more detail, explaining concepts like
coercion and qualia structure. In Pustejovsky’s work these ideas only get applied on the
sentence level. Section 3 will show how the ideas of Van der Sandt and Pustejovsky fit
together very nicely, even complementing each other and we will show that bridging operates
intra- as well as inter-sentential. In section 3.4 we will present some examples of linking ,
bridging and accommodation, and in section 4 we will discuss the notion of functional
composition and coercion in this model.
2 Qualia Structure and Coercion
2.1 Qualia Structure
In [Pustejovsky, 1991] and subsequent papers the notions of coercion and qualia structure
have been introduced. Qualia structure can be seen as a set of lexical entailments. For
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instance, the word book entails at least the two events of reading and writing it, besides the
knowledge that it consists of several separate parts, like the cover, pages, etc. Pustejovsky
suggests four qualia roles to represent such knowledge: formal, constitutive, telic
and agentive. In [Pustejovsky, 1991] these have been defined as follows2:
• formal: That which distinguishes the object within a larger domain.
• constitutive: The relation between an object and its constituents or proper parts.
• telic: Purpose and function of the object.
• agentive: Factors involved in the origin or ”bringing about” of an object.
The exact structure of this kind of lexical semantic knowledge seems to be very intricate.
Again for the same example, it is important for instance to realize that a book is at the
same time a physical object and an information container. The first description considers
the physical viewpoint, whereas the second defines the conceptual angle of what constitutes
our idea of a book. What angle one takes (physical object or information container) has
immediate consequences for the knowledge that is represented in the rest of the qualia
structure. The composing parts of the physical side of a book (pages, cover, etc.) are
different from those of the conceptual side (title, sections, paragraphs, etc.). The same goes
for the representation of typical events a book is involved in. The physical ’quality’ (qual)
of a book can be printed, typeset or even shelved. The information ’quality’ can be said to
undergo the events of reading, writing as mentioned before. It is however undeniable that
the two main qualities of book, along with all their entailments, are intimately related to
each other and should be represented accordingly in one comprehensive (qualia) structure.
2.2 Coercion
The need for a rich lexical semantic knowledge representation like qualia structure becomes
clear in considering sentences like (5) above, which is repeated here:
(6) I would like to begin a new book tonight.
As mentioned before, the verb begin expects an event here but has to settle for an artifact
(book). We can now use the qualia structure of this artifact to infer some event that is
entailed by it and which can stand in its place. This is an example of what Pustejovsky
has called metonymic reconstruction [Pustejovsky, 1991] for cases where an interpretation
can be inferred from some partial meaning of the word in question. In more general terms,
anytime a word or phrase is not of the desired type3 (like artifact, event, etc.) we are
2In more common AI-related terms we could rephrase them as: formal - isa, constitutive - part-
of / hasa, telic - purpose and agentive - cause.
3Possibly this use of the term type is not appropriate and we should use sort instead. However, here we
present the terms as they have been defined by [Pustejovsky, 1991].
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allowed to coerce it into one of its entailments that is of the appropriate type, where the
entailments are stored in its qualia structure. Another example of this is the following
sentence:
(7) BMW announced a new model.
Here the verb announce is looking for a subject of type animate while only one of type
institute is available. The qualia structure of any institute however should represent the
fact that they are made up of people, which are animate entities. So, in this sentence we
can infer that some human at the BMW company did the actual announcement.
This summarizes Pustejovsky’s program as described in [Pustejovsky, 1991] and subsequent
papers. In this paper we extend coercion with the notion of context, which seems not only a
valid research topic but also desperately needed because of the restricted explaining power
of coercion if context is not considered. Take for instance sentence (8) :
(8) John began a book.
Although above we assumed several times that one can infer read and write events from
the qualia structure of book in order to make this sentence semantically well formed, this
can only be a default approximation. We would need an actual context for this sentence
to decide what event exactly should be inferred. Imagine for instance a dinner, organized
by the literary and culinary society, where all dishes are shaped in the form of
books. . .4
This example is farfetched, but it may make the point more clear. We do not assume that
the qualia structure of book should contain any reference to this particular example. It
is important however to realize that any artifact entails by default a number of events in
which it is engaged. In this particular context these events would be overruled.
4Still another problem concerning the lack of context is illustrated by the following examples where no
argument at all is available for coercion to take place, Monday and yesterday are modifiers:
I propose Monday.
I began yesterday.
Pustejovsky (personal communication) has termed this loosely as null coercion, because although coercion
should take place it cannot be executed properly. Taking context into account could be of help however to
make the sentences sound more natural, as the following examples show:
Let’s make an appointment. I propose Monday.
Let’s play darts. I begin.
It seems that null coercion should coerce an anaphor which is of the required type. In both examples this
would be event-type anaphors.
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3 Bridging in DRT with Qualia Structure
This section shows how we deal with anaphora resolution in general, and particularly
bridging, in a version of DRT which uses extensively qualia information. We define the
language of Discourse Representation Structures (DRSs) of our extended DRT, show how
resolution works, and finally give some detailed examples.
3.1 A Sketch of the Architecture
Basically, we extend Van der Sandt’s theory of presupposition with the notion of bridging
anaphora. In short, Van der Sandt views presupposition as anaphora with more descrip-
tive content, and uses one and the same mechanism for dealing with both phenomena
[Van der Sandt, 1992]. Anaphoric information can either be resolved to an antecedent that
is available from discourse, or if no antecedent is found, be accommodated. We add a
possibility of bridging to the resolution algorithm. The basic architecture of the system is:
1. parse sentence: result is a sentence-DRS
2. merge sentence-DRS with main-DRS
3. perform anaphora resolution
A sentence-DRS is a DRS with all anaphoric information unresolved, and is the result
of a bottom-up driven semantic construction dependent on some syntactic structure. A
sentence-DRS can be viewed as a sort of under-specified logical form with respect to
anaphoric information. Special types of DRSs (α-DRSs) mark anaphoric information.
The main-DRS is the DRS of the context interpreted so far. It is a proper DRS, i.e.,
a DRS with no unresolved anaphoric information. Proper DRSs can be interpreted as in
standard DRT: they are true with respect to a certain model if they can be embedded in
that model ([Kamp and Reyle, 1993]. Before we explain how anaphora resolution works
we define DRSs and the merging operation.
3.2 Discourse Representation Structures
Let’s introduce some terminology. Discourse markers are variables ranging over objects in
the domain. Terms are either discourse markers or DRSs. Furthermore, we adopt a typed
lambda-calculus for DRSs [Bos et al., 1994, Muskens, 1993]. DRSs are defined as follows:
Definition 1. DRS
If U is a set of discourse markers, C is a set of DRS-Conditions, and t1,...,tn
terms, then < U,C > is a DRS, < U,C > ⊕ < U ′, C ′ > is a DRS, λ t1,...,tn.
< U,C > is a DRS. Nothing else is a DRS.
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Definition 2. DRS-Conditions
If x1,..,xn are discourse markers, P an n-place condition, K and K1 DRSs, then
P(x1,...,xn), x1 = x2, K→ K1, ¬ K, K ∨ K1, α:K, and Q:K are DRS-Conditions.
Nothing else is a DRS-Condition.
The first five DRS-Conditions we already know from standard DRT [Kamp and Reyle, 1993]
and need no further explanation. So called α-DRSs represent unresolved anaphoric infor-
mation. DRSs that contain α-DRSs are therefore unresolved DRSs. Q-DRSs represent
qualia structure, with QF for formal, QC for constitutive, QA for agentive and QT for telic.
For notational purposes we use Q to represents a set of qualia-DRSs5. Now for merging:
Definition 3. Merging (⊕).
< U1, C1 > ⊕ < U2, C2 >=< U1 ∪ U2, C1 ∪ C2 >
The merge operation takes two DRSs and makes a union of the sets of discourse markers
and a union of the sets conditions. Merging of DRSs is used both for constructing DRSs
(cf. [Bos et al., 1994]) and coercive accommodation.
The latter term brings us to the next definition. Qualia-information, represented in Q-
DRSs is normally not accessible and does not affect the truth-conditions of a DRS. It is
introduced in the lexicon and brought into discourse via the DRS bottom-up construction
algorithm. If necessary, for example to play the role of antecedent, the qualia structure is
put forward to the surface by a process we call coercive accommodation. It is defined as a
function from DRSs to sets of DRSs:
Definition 4. Coercive Accommodation (CA).
ca(< U,C >) = {< U,C > ⊕ K | Q:K ∈ C}
Note that CA is always local: it cannot accommodate qualia information which is embed-
ded. Note also that we have defined CA only for DRS without lambda’s: this will do for
the purposes of this paper. Q-DRSs are also used for type coercion, which is discussed later
on in this paper.
In DRT the structure of DRSs restricts the choice of possible antecedents of an anaphoric
construction. For a discourse marker to be the antecedent for an anaphor, it must be
accessible from the DRS which the anaphor is represented. To define accessibility of DRSs
and discourse markers we first use the notion subordination between DRSs. We adopt the
notation C(K) meaning the set of conditions of DRS (K), and U(K) meaning the set of
discourse markers of K.
5As mentioned in section 2.1 on page 3, the distinction that is made in the formal role carries through
in all other qualia roles. This could be represented by embedding QC , QA and QT in QF . This is beyond
the scope of our paper.
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Definition 5. Subordination.
If K1, K2, and K3 are DRSs, then K2 is subordinated to K1 (or K1 subordinates
K2) if K1 ⊕ K2, K1 → K2 ∈ C(K3), K2 → K3 ∈ C(K1), ¬ K2 ∈ C(K1), K2
∨ K3 ∈ C(K1), K3 ∨ K2 ∈ C(K1), α:K2 ∈ C(K1), Q:K2 ∈ C(K1), and K2 is
subordinated to K3 and K3 is subordinated to K1.
So, if x is a discourse marker and K1 and K2 are DRSs, and x is in the domain of K1 (x ∈
U(K1)), then x is accessible from K2 if K2 is subordinated to K1.
3.3 Anaphora Resolution
Left to explain is how anaphora resolution works. We repeat for convenience that resolution
can take place in three different ways:
1. resolution to an accessible, suitable discourse marker (linking)
2. resolution to coercively accommodated material of an accessible DRS (bridging)
3. accommodation of the anaphoric information to an accessible DRS (accommodation)
We introduced accessibility already, but haven’t explained yet the notion of ‘suitable’ dis-
course marker, or better: suitable DRSs. Suitability is an extra constraint on the choice of
antecedent. A DRS is suitable to another DRS if there is a way you find a match between
discourse markers and conditions between both. More formally:
Definition 6. Suitability.
ADRS K2 ism-suitable to DRS K1 if there is a mappingm such that scope(m)=U(K2)
and for every x it is the case that m(x) ∈ U(K1) and there is a DRS K3 such
that C(K3) ⊆ C(K1) if U(K3) = { m(x) | x ∈ U(K1)}.
We now introduce the heart of the system: anaphora resolution. This algorithm works
as follows. All anaphoric information in the main-DRS (of course after merging it with
the sentence-DRS of the last processed sentence) is resolved. This information is clearly
marked because these are just our α-DRSs. Resolution either unifies this material with a
suitable antecedent or accommodates it, and as a result, α-DRSs disappear. After resolving
all α-DRSs, we are left with a proper-DRS, a DRS which is fully specified with respect to
anaphoric information. This DRS is model-theoretically interpretable, as in standard DRT.
To describe the component, we use Kα to indicate anaphoric DRSs, and Km for the main-
DRS. Definition 7 describes a function that takes a certain main-DRS and a certain α-DRS
from it, and returns a set of DRSs (since there could be more than one possible antecedent
or accommodation site) with this α-DRS resolved. The output of this function can be fed
back into the same function until all anaphoric information is resolved (all α-DRS have
been consumed).6
6The order of which resolution of anaphoric structure takes place is important as well. We don’t pay
any attention to this, but see [Van der Sandt, 1992].
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Definition 7. Anaphora Resolution.
ar(Kα,Km) = { K’ | K’ ∈ link(Kα,Km) } iff |link(Kα,Km)| > 0
= { K’ | K’ ∈ bridge(Kα,Km) } iff |link(Kα,Km)| = 0 and
|bridge(Kα,Km)| > 0
= { K’ | K’ ∈ acc(Kα,Km) } iff |link(Kα,Km)| = 0 and
|bridge(Kα,Km)| = 0
Note that this definition prefers linking to bridging, and bridging to accommodation, which
we assume is right. link, bridge, and acc are functions from the main DRS to sets of
DRSs. We use DRSsubstitution to describe these operations ([ K1 / K2 ] K3 means that
K1 is substituted for K2 in K3).
Definition 8. Linking.
link(Kα,Km) = { [ K3 / K2 ] Km | Kα is subordinated and m-suitable
to K1 & α:Kα ∈ C(K2) & U(K3)=U(K2) ∪ U(Kα) &
C(K3)=C(K2)-α:Kα ∪ C(Kα) ∪ { x=y | m(x)=y } }
Definition 9. Bridging.
bridge(Kα,Km) = { K’m | Kα is subordinated K4 & K1 ∈ ca(K4) &
m-suitable to K1 & α:Kα ∈ C(K2) &
U(K3)=U(K2) ∪ U(Kα) & C(K3)=C(K2)-α:Kα ∪ C(Kα)
∪ { x=y | m(x)=y } & K’m = [ K3 / K2 ] Km & K’m =
[ K1 / K4 ] Km }
Definition 10. Accommodation.
acc(Kα,Km) = { K’m | Kα is subordinated to K1 & α:Kα ∈
C(K2) & U(K3)=U(K2) & C(K3)=C(K2)-α:Kα &
K’m=[ K1 ⊕ Kα / K1 ] Km & K’m=[ K3 / K2 ] Km }
Accommodation has its limits. First, it shouldn’t introduce free variables, and Van der
Sandt introduces a number of acceptability rules for accommodation. These are briefly:
resolution should not introduce contradictions and require a contribution to discourse. For
more discussion on this issue the interested reader should consult [Van der Sandt, 1992].
3.4 Examples of Linking, Bridging and Accommodation
This section exemplifies the notions linking, bridging, and accommodation, which we in-
troduced in the previous section. We will do this in view of the examples given in the
introduction. For each of these examples we give the DRS with all anaphoric information
unresolved, and the fully resolved derived after anaphora resolution as well. For reasons of
clarity, only the relevant parts of the DRSs are deeply analyzed.
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3.4.1 Linking
The first example involves simple linking between anaphor and antecedent. Consider the
unresolved DRS of (2):
x
celebrity(x)
I-invite(x)
→
α:
y
celebrity(y)
never-comes(y)
The definite description introduces an α-DRS for the celebrity, since this is presupposed
information. Trying to link this anaphoric information is successful, since there is an
accessible suitable discourse marker available. The result is the resolved DRS:
x
celebrity(x)
I-invite(x)
→
y
celebrity(y)
y=x
never-comes(y)
This DRS can be read as: If I invite a celebrity, he never comes.
3.4.2 Bridging
Now for our bridging7 example. The unresolved DRS of example (3) is (simplifying the
Q-DRS for convenience):
7Bridging does not seem to be the preferred option in the case of resolution of pronouns as the following
examples show:
When I go to a bar, he always throws me out.
When BMW announced a new model, he looked very proud.
In both sentences a reading for ’he’ can be found by linking to coercively accommodated material out
of the Q-DRS from respectively bar and BMW, i.e. a barkeeper or a spokesperson. However they don’t
seem to be the preferred readings as has been shown by [McGlashan, 1992, Sanford and Garrod, 1981] for
similar examples.
9
x
bar(x)
Q:
z
barkeeper(z)
of(z,x)
I-go-to(x)
→
α:
y
barkeeper(y)
always-throws-me-out(y)
The presupposition trigger the barkeeper introduces the anaphoric information. Linking
fails, the only available discourse marker is not suitable since the condition of anaphoric
information does not match with it. Bridging is successful, though, yielding the resolved
DRS:
x z
bar(x)
Q
I-go-to(x)
barkeeper(z)
of(z,x)
→
y
barkeeper(y)
y=z
always-throws-me-out(y)
This DRS does not assume a particular barkeeper that throws the speaker out, but a
barkeeper that belongs to the bar the speaker goes to – the correct prediction.
3.4.3 Accommodation
Accommodation is our emergency case: if everything fails, then accommodate. This hap-
pens in cases like (1), which unresolved DRS is:
x
party(x)
I-give(x)
→
α:
y
king-of-france(y)
α:
z
always-attends(y,z)
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The pronoun represented by the discourse marker z can be linked to x. But we cannot link
the king of France to some accessible discourse marker, nor is there a way to make bridging
inference. The only possibility left is to accommodate the king:
y
king-of-france(y)
x
party(x)
I-give(x)
→
z
z=x
always-attends(y,z)
This DRS represents the reading: there is a king of France, and if I give a party, he will
attend it. This is again the correct prediction.
4 Functional Composition and Coercion
4.1 Defining the notions
Functional Composition, including type coercion, is defined as follows, K1 being the functor,
K2 the argument, and ~σ a sequence of terms such that K2(t)(~σ) is a proposition:
Definition 11. Functional Composition (⊙).
K1 ⊙ K2 = λ ~σ. K1(λ v. (K2(v)(~σ))) iff K1 is of type < α,t> and v is of type α;
= K1 ⊙ K3 (where K3 ∈ tc(K2)) otherwise.
Clause one is like the functional composition rule (in [Bos et al., 1994]). This rule has the
nice property that it doesn’t need type-shifting of arguments. It always binds the first
argument position of the argument, and has functional application as a special case (~σ is
empty then). The second clause does the type coercion stuff (cf. [Pustejovsky, 1993]):
Definition 12. Type Coercion (TC).
tc(K)={ K′ ⊙ K | K′ ∈ qa(K) }
Definition 13. Qualia Access (QA).
qa(K)={ KQ | Q:KQ ∈ C(K) or qa(K’) where K’ is a sub-DRS of K }
Note that tc also works for arbitrarily deep embedded DRSs by use of the Qualia Access
function. This is nice for quantified NPs like every book, where the qualia DRSs lexically
introduced for book has been placed in the restrictor.
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4.2 Some lexical entries
In this section we present some example lexical entries. In this paper we will only assign
(a simplified) qualia structure to nouns8, see book. Lexical entries can be abbreviated by
their boldface notation – write stands for the semantic part of the lexical entry of write.
We use small e,x,y and z for variables over type e (for entities, i.e. objects and events),
capital P for DRS of type <e,t> (properties), and capital E for event-types (normally
< e, t >).
book: λz.
z
book(z)
QF: info cont(z)
QC:
Z
sections(Z)
has(z,Z)
QA: write
QT: read
By introducing determiners (a, the, every) we account for the possibility to carry qualia
structure through the derivation. Note the difference between these three determiners. The
article the introduces an α-DRS since it is a presupposition trigger.
a : λ P1 P2.
x
⊕ P1(x) ⊕ P2(x)
the : λ P1 P2.
α:
x
⊕ P1(x)
⊕ P2(x)
every: λ P1 P2. x ⊕ P1(x) → P2(x)
The proper name john introduces an anaphoric DRS which is merged with the represen-
tation of its predicate. Proper names do not have qualia structure (see footnote earlier).
john : λ P.
α:
x
john(x)
⊕ P(x)
8[Pustejovsky, 1995] assumes qualia structures for all categories.
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The verbs write and read introduce event-types. Lambda-operators bind the variables
that will fulfill the thematic roles agent and theme.
write: λ y x e.
write(e)
agent(e,x)
theme(e,y)
read : λ y x e.
read(e)
agent(e,x)
theme(e,y)
The aspectual verb begin expects something that expresses an event-type. We here simply
treat it as a modifier, and ignore its further aspectual presuppositions.
Finally, tense pres applies to an event-type and binds off the event variable:the result is a
DRS of type t, i.e. a DRS with no lambda variables.
begin: λ E x e.
begin(e)
⊕ E(x)(e)
pres : λ E.
e
now(e)
⊕ E(e)
4.3 A sample derivation
Let us now follow the derivation of ‘John begins a book’. Functional composition of a with
book yields a noun phrase that contains the qualia structure of the noun and awaits a
property to merge with.
a ⊙ book = λP.
z
book(z)
QF: info cont(z)
QC:
Z
sections(Z)
has(z,Z)
QA: write
QT: read
⊕ P(z)
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Functional composition of begin with a ⊙ book can only work with a type coercion. The
event that begin requires cannot be found directly, so no simple link can be made. From
the qualia structure of a ⊙ book we can for example coerce read, and this qualifies as the
required event. This coercion step is worked out later.
begin ⊙ (a ⊙ book) = λ x. e.
y
begin(e)
read(e)
agent(e,x)
theme(e,y)
book(y)
Q
The rest of the derivation follows straightforwardly. begin ⊙ (a ⊙ book) functionally
composed with john results in a lambda-DRS.
john ⊙ (begin ⊙ (a ⊙ book)) = λ e.
y
α:
x
john(x)
begin(e)
read(e)
agent(e,x)
theme(e,y)
book(y)
Q
Adding tense (pres) to the lambda-DRS turns it into a proper DRS – all anaphoric in-
formation has been resolved and no antecedent for the presupposed event needed to be
accommodated.
pres ⊙ (john ⊙ (begin ⊙ (a ⊙ book))) =
e y
α:
x
john(x)
now(e)
begin(e)
read(e)
agent(e,x)
theme(e,y)
book(y)
Q
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Naturally we could just as easily have taken write instead of read, or for that matter, any
of the other events that occur in the qualia structure of book. Since read and write are
the only events, the result of coercing a book is as follows:
tc(λP.
z
book(z)
QF: info cnt(z)
QC:
Z
sections(Z)
has(z,Z)
QA: write
QT: read
⊕ P(z)) = { λx.e.
z
book(z)
write(e)
agent(e,x)
theme(e,z)
Q
, λx.e.
z
book(z)
read(e)
agent(e,x)
theme(e,z)
Q
}
5 Conclusions and Further Work
We have shown that Bridging and Coercion can be seen in very much the same light, viz.
as using implicit lexical information to accommodate a missing antecedent. In doing so,
we have extended Pustejovsky’s ideas on Coercion and placed it in a discourse perspective.
On the other hand we have extended Van der Sandt’s algorithm with Bridging, and thus
made it more complete with respect to the linguistic data.
The work presented here is limited to definite descriptions; we have not looked into other
presupposition triggers. [Beaver, 1993] mentions the following examples, where inferencing
takes place.
(9) Probably, if Jane takes a bath, Bill will be annoyed that there is no more hot
water.
(10) If Spaceman Spiff lands on Planet X, he will be bothered by the fact that his
weight is higher than it would be on Earth.
In (9) the inference is made that taking a bath uses up a hot water reservoir, in (10) that
landing on a strange planet may make changes to your weight. To fit with these examples
in the framework we presented in this paper remains for future research.
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